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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Introduction.

This case was first before this Court in 2017, when this Coutt affirmed the district coutt's
grant of summary judgment in favor of Respondent, Idaho Independent Bank ("IIB"). Idaho

lndep. Bank v. Frantz, 162 Idaho 509, 399 P.3d 836 (2017) ("First Appeal"). Thereafter, postjudgment proceedings occutTed during which IIB sought to pmtially recover upon the judgment
("Judgment") that had been affirmed by the First Appeal. R. at 10-12. The scope of this

Coutt's review in the appeal at hand is limited to the post-judgment proceedings, as any prejudgment issues were either resolved by, or should have been raised in, the First Appeal.
I

Appellant, Martin Frantz ("Frantz" ), ignores the limited scope of this appeal, attempts to relitigate the merits of the First Appeal, and raises new issues for the first time on appeal. In
addition to being procedurally defective, Frantz's arguments are substantively meritless. For
these reasons, IIB respectfully requests that this Coutt dismiss Frantz's arguments on appeal and
awat'd costs and attorney's fees to IIB.
B.

Nature of the Case.

It is worth noting that this appeal is one of two appeals currently before this Coutt. The

companion appeal is Idaho Supreme Coutt Case No. 46237-2018 ("Companion Appeal"). In
the Companion Appeal, Frantz disputes IIB's ownership of certain counter-claims and the rights
1

It appears that this appeal was brought only by Mr. Frantz, as the Appellate Brief is only
signed by Mr. Frantz and a non-attorney cannot represent another patty. See Citibank (S.D.),
N.A. v. Carroll, 148 Idaho 254, 260, 220 P.3d 1073, 1079 (2009). In light of Mrs. Frantz's
abandonment of the appeal, and in the interest of simplicity and readability, all future references
to Mr. and Mrs. Frantz will be in the singular form.
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of IIB to dismiss those counterclaims. Curiously, Frantz also briefly raises the ownership of the
counter-claims issue in his Appellate Brief in this appeal, but that issue is not properly before
this Court in this appeal. Appellant's Br. at 12-13; 19, 24-26.
As mentioned above, in the First Appeal, this Court affi1med the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of IIB. Idaho Indep. Bank, 162 Idaho at 516, 399 P.3d at 843.
Specifically, this Court affirmed the district court's holding that IIB was entitled to judgment in
the sum of $9,193,546.50, plus interest, fees, and costs against Frantz because Frantz had
induced IIB to provide construction loans to his closely-held corporation ("Eagle Ridge") by
unconditionally guaranteeing Eagle Ridge's indebtedness to IIB. Id. at 510,399 P.3d at 837.
After the district comt granted summary judgment in IIB's favor, IIB sought to pmtially
recover upon the Judgment via sheriffs sale. R. at 10, 126-32, 141-46. In response, Frantz
filed a Motion to Extend Filing Date for Claim of Exemption ("Motion to Extend"), wherein
Frantz alleged that IIB failed to provide timely notice of the sheriffs sale. Id. at 14-16. After
the patties briefed and argued the motion, the district court, with the Honorable Judge Yerby
temporarily presiding, denied Frantz's motion ("Sheriff Sale Order"). Id. at 208-14. This is
the first of two orders within the nmmw scope of this appeal.
Refusing to accept the district court's Sheriff Sale Order, Frantz filed: (1) a Motion for
Reconsideration ("Motion to Reconsider"); (2) a Motion for Mistrial and Judgment Vacation
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure ("Motion to Vacate"); and (3) a
Notice for ADA Accommodation ("ADA Notice"). Id. at 239-50, 333-42. Frantz's arguments
in the motions were difficult to follow, but his primary argument was that the Judgment, which
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was affirmed by this Court in the First Appeal, should be vacated because Frantz is pro se and
dyslexic and because Judge Yerby was allegedly biased when he heard Frantz's Motion to
Extend and issued the conesponding Sheriff Sale Order.

Id.

Although Frantz's Motion to

Reconsider was an ostensibly proper attempt to obtain relief, his Motion to Vacate was puzzling
because it sought to re-litigate the issues that were resolved by this Court in the First Appeal. Id.
In any event, a hearing on the motions ("ReconsiderN acate Hearing") was held wherein the
Honorable Judge Christensen noted that Frantz was provided a reasonable ADA accommodation.
Hr' g Tr. at 13 :8-9 (Oct. 24, 2017).

Further, after full briefing and oral argument, Judge

Christensen issued an order denying both ofFrantz's motions ("ReconsiderNacate Order"). R.
at 363-68. This is the second of two orders within the nanow scope of this appeal.
In his Appellate Brief, Frantz appears to assett that the entire case (which commenced in
2010) is tainted and the Judgment (which was entered on January 7, 2016, and affirmed by the
First Appeal on July 10, 2017) must be vacated because Judge Verby's post-judgment Sheriff
Sale Order was a product of judicial bias. Frantz claims that Judge Verby's bias stems from a
separate dispute between Frantz and a third-party that Judge Yerby mediated in November 2016.
Appellant's Br. at 20-31.

Frantz asserts that Judge Yerby allegedly learned "damaging

evidence" about Frantz during the mediation; however, Frantz fails to support his assertion with
citations to the record. Id. at 19, 26, 28-30, 32, 36, 41, 44. Additionally, Frantz alleges that the
Judgment should be vacated because he was not provided a reasonable ADA accommodation at
the ReconsiderNacate Hearing.

Id. at 32-35.

Notably, Frantz's Appellate Brief does not

address the appealable issues before this Court, i.e., the merits of the Sheriff Sale Order and the
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ReconsiderNacate Order. In addition to being procedurally defective, Frantz's arguments are
contrary to law and fact; therefore, IIB respectfully requests that this Court dismiss Frantz's
appeal.
C.

Facts and Procedm·e.

Although the scope of this appeal is limited to the post-judgment execution proceedings,
the facts and procedure leading up to, and including, the First Appeal will be discussed to
provide context. As a preliminary matter, this Court should not rely upon Frantz's "Master
Guide" for the facts and procedure of this case, which Frantz attached to his Appellate Brief as
an exhibit.

There are three issues with Frantz's Master Guide.

First, Frantz includes the

declaration of Scott Gibson in his Master Guide without explaining that the same report was
struck by the district court on October 27, 2015. Compare Master Guide at 304-29 with First
Appeal Record at 923-26. Second, Frantz attaches revised documents to his Master Guide under
the auspice they are the same documents as those in the record, without disclosing that he in fact
has altered those documents. Compare Master Guide at 1-12, 345-80 with R. at 239-50, 381417. Third, Frantz includes several documents in the Master Guide that are not in the record on
appeal or the record from the First Appeal. Master Guide at 113-29, 143-45, 189-299, 301,
336-44, and 381-411. In addition to being inaccurate, Frantz's Master Guide is procedurally
defective because he did not comply with Idaho Appellate Rule 30 in attempting to augment the
record on appeal. I.A.R. 30. In short, the record on appeal should be referenced-not Frantz's
Master Guide-for the facts and procedure of this appeal.
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1.

Leading Up To, and Including, the First Appeal,

On July 19, 2010, IIB initiated this case by filing a Verified Complaint for Breach of
Guaranty against Frantz ("Guaranty Action"). Idaho Indep. Bank v. Frantz, 162 Idaho 509,
510, 399 P.3d 836, 837 (2017); R. at 2. On March 23, 2011, Frantz filed an Amended Verified
Answer, in which he admitted the material allegations in IIB 's complaint, but asserted
Affirmative Defenses, Counterclaims (against IIB) and a Third Party Complaint (against Eagle
Ridge). Idaho Indep. Bank, 162 Idaho at 510,399 P.3d at 837; R. at 3.
In October 2011, the Guaranty Action was stayed because Frantz filed a Chapter 11
bankruptcy petition in the District of Idaho, Case No. 11-21337-TLM ("Bankruptcy Case").
Idaho Indep. Bank, 162 Idaho at 510, 399 P.3d at 837; R. at 3. On April 23, 2013, Frantz
converted his Bankruptcy Case from a Chapter 11 reorganization to a Chapter 7 liquidation, and
a trustee ("Trustee") was duly appointed to represent the estate ("Estate"). Idaho Indep. Bank,
162 Idaho at 510, 399 P.3d at 837. On August 23, 2013, IIB filed an adversary complaint in the
Bankruptcy Case wherein it argued that Frantz's debt to IIB was non-dischargeable because it
was fraudulently obtained ("Fraud Action"). Id. While pursuing the Fraud Action in Frantz's
Bankruptcy Case, IIB took the deposition of Dirk Roeller. As recognized by the district comi,
Mr. Roeller's deposition testimony pertained to the Fraud Action in the Bankruptcy Case-not
•

this case. R. at 367; Hr'g Tr. at 22: 15 - 23:13 (Oct. 24, 2017).

2

2

On pages 22 through 24 of the hearing transcript, IIB's counsel's statements are mistakenly
identified as Mr. Frantz's statements. Hr'g Tr. at 22:1 - 24:4 (Oct. 24, 2017) (note that Judge
Cln·istensen asked IIB 's counsel to respond at lines 2 and 3 of page 22, yet the subsequent
statements are incorrectly identified as Mr. Frantz's words).
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Despite the fact that Frantz initiated the Bankruptcy Case, less than two weeks before the
trial was to commence on IIB's Fraud Action, Frantz filed a voluntary waiver of discharge in the
Bankruptcy Case, which was approved by the banlauptcy court. Idaho Indep. Bank, 162 Idaho
at 510, 399 P.3d at 837. As a result, Frantz's IIB debt became non-dischargeable and the
bankruptcy comt was deprived of jurisdiction on the Fraud Action. Id. The bankruptcy court
dismissed the Fraud Action without prejudice but awarded $49,477.46 in sanctions against
Frantz and his attorney for misusing "litigation tactics to cause economic injury to an opponent
and its counsel in the form of increased litigation costs." Id. at 510-11, 399 P.3d at 837-38.
Thus, as noted by Judge Christensen in the ReconsiderNacate Order, Mr. Roeller's testimony
was not heard by any court because his testimony was only relevant to the Fraud Action, which
3

was deemed moot when Frantz filed the voluntary waiver of discharge . R. at 366-67; Hr'g Tr.
at 22:23 - 23: 16 (Oct. 24, 2017).
In light of Frantz's voluntary waiver of discharge, the bankruptcy stay in the Guaranty
Action was no longer necessary. Accordingly, the Guaranty Action resumed on May 27, 2015,
when IIB filed a Notice of Termination of Automatic Stay. Idaho Indep. Bank, 162 Idaho at 511,
399 P.3d at 838; R. at 4. On September 21, 2015, IIB filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
wherein it argued that it was entitled to summary judgment because: (1) Frantz unconditionally
guaranteed Eagle Ridge's debt to IIB by signing the guaranties; (2) there was no merit to
3

As an aside, Frantz did not include Mr. Roeller's deposition testimony in the record on
appeal or to the district comt. Indeed, the only references to Mr. Roeller in the record on appeal
are in Frantz's memoranda and declarations and Judge Cl11'istensen's ReconsiderNacate Order.
R. at 242-46, 252-54, 366-67, 401.
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Frantz's affirmative defenses; and (3) Frantz's counterclaims should be dismissed because they
were owned by the bankruptcy Trustee.

4

Idaho Indep. Bank, 162 Idaho at 511,399 P.3d at 838;

R. at 4-5. In response, Frantz filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment wherein he argued
that the debt was settled by accord and satisfaction. Id.; R. at 4-5.
On January 8, 2016, the district court denied Frantz's motion, granted IIB's motion, and
issued Judgment in favor of IIB for $9,193,546.50, plus interest. Id.; R. at 6-7, 47-49. The
district court certified the Judgment as final, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Procedure 54(b). Idaho

Indep. Bank, 162 Idaho at 511, 399 P.3d at 838; R. at 6.

Frantz filed a Motion for

Reconsideration which, after full briefing and oral argument, was denied. Idaho Indep. Bank,
162 Idaho at 511,399 P.3d at 838; R. at 7-8.
On May 19, 2016, Frantz filed a Notice of Appeal. R. at 9. Although represented by
counsel through the briefing of the First Appeal, Frantz opted to argue the First Appeal pro se.

Idaho Indep. Bank, 162 Idaho at 509,399 P.3d at 837, n.l.
On July 17, 2017, this Coutt affamed the Judgment and awarded costs and attorney's
fees on appeal to IIB. Id. at 517, 399 P.3d at 844. Frantz filed a Petition for Rehearing, which
this Coutt denied, and a Remittitur was issued on August 21, 2017. Id. at 509, 399 P.3d at 836;
R. at 11.

4

When the Bankruptcy Case was converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation, the Estate,
represented by the Trustee, became the owner of Frantz's counterclaims against IIB. Eisen v.
CoBen (In re Eisen), 31 F.3d 1447, 1451 n.2 (9th Cir. 1994).
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2.

Post-Judgment.

In January 2017, IIB initiated proceedings to enforce and partially recover upon the
Judgment. R. at 10, 126-32. A Writ of Execution for $10,012,665.29 was issued on January 27,
2017.

Id.

On April 12, 2017, the Kootenai County Sheriff issued a Notice of Levy and

Attachment, wherein the Sheriff attached: (1) Frantz's administrative claim of $113,841.10 that
Frantz had asseiied in the Bankruptcy Case; and (2) a bankruptcy appeal that Frantz had filed
with the Ninth Circuit BAP (collectively, "Bankruptcy Claims"). Id. at 144-46. Thereafter, a
Notice of Sheriffs Sale was issued setting a public sale of the Bankruptcy Claims for 10:00 a.m.
on May 9, 2017, at the Kootenai County Sheriffs Department ("Sheriff's Sale"). Id. at 10, 12022. On May 8, 2017, Frantz sent a document entitled "Claim of Exemption" to the Sheriff;
however, that document did not identify an exemption, nor did it comply with the requirements
ofldaho Code Section 8-507C. Id. at 17-19. Thus, the Sheriff proceeded with the Sheriffs Sale
as noticed. Id. at 134-37. IIB was the successful bidder at the Sheriffs Sale, and on May 10,
2017, the Sheriff issued a Sheriffs Ce1iificate of Sale, which transfened all of Frantz's interests
in the Bankruptcy Claims to IIB. Id. at 156-57.
After the Sheriffs Sale, on May 16, 2017, Frantz filed the Motion to Extend, wherein he
alleged that his receipt of the Sheriff Sale documents was delayed due to IIB's clerical errors. Id.
at 10-11, 14-19. IIB filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Extend and a
declaration, which set forth evidence demonstrating that the delivery of the Sheriff Sale
documents complied with the applicable statutes, Id. at 11, 20-172. On June 6, 2017, Judge
Yerby heard oral argument on the matter, and on July 20, 2017, Judge Yerby issued the Sheriff
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Sale Order, which denied Frantz's Motion to Extend on two independent grounds.

5

Id. at 11,

208-13. First, Judge Yerby held that it would be futile to allow Frantz to file an untimely claim
of exemption because the statutory exemptions did not apply to the Bankruptcy Claims. Id. at
211.

Judge Yerby noted that, because Frantz had failed to identify an applicable Idaho

exemption in both his motion and at oral argument, "[i]t would be an exercise in futility to allow
an extension of time to file a claim of exemption when no valid exemption applies." Id. Second,
Judge Yerby found that Frantz failed to rebut IIB's prima facie showing that the Sheriff Sale
documents were properly delivered. Id. at 211-13.
On August 1, 2017, Frantz filed a Motion to Reconsider Judge Yerby's Sheriff Sale
Order.

Id. at 11. Frantz did not schedule the hearing for the Motion to Reconsider until

October 24, 2017. Id. at 12. On August 23, 2017, while communicating with the district court to
schedule the hearing, Frantz asked for several hours to argue the motion. Hr'g Tr. at 19:4-5
(Oct. 24, 2017).

The district court staff member informed Frantz that, to accommodate his

request for a two to three hour hearing, the hearing date would have to be pushed to late October
and would be heard by Judge Luster. Id. at 19:4-8. Frantz responded, "Judge Christensen is the
most familiar with this case history and then Judge Yerby. If we can get one of them, we can
likely keep it to one and half to two hours. What date in October, you !mow, are you looking
at?" Id. at 19:9-13. Ultimately, Judge Christensen presided over the hearing. Id. at 3.
5

Judge Christensen was assigned to the case, but he was on vacation during the hearing on
the Motion to Extend; therefore, Judge Yerby sat in for the hearing and issued the conesponding
Sheriff Sale Order. However, the fact that Judge Christensen was on vacation is not located in
the Record on Appeal.
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On October 13, 2017, eleven (11) days before the scheduled hearing, Frantz filed an
additional motion-the Motion to Vacate. Id. at 12, 239-332. In the Motion to Vacate, it
appears that Frantz argued that the Judgment, which this Coutt affirmed in the First Appeal,
should be vacated because Judge Yerby was allegedly biased against Frantz in ruling on the
single post-judgment Motion to Extend in July 2017 (a year after the Judgment had been
entered). Id. To that end, Frantz claimed that in November 2016, Judge Yerby served as an
attorney-mediator for litigation between Frantz and Dirk Roeller ("Frantz/Roeller Dispute").

Id. at 240-42.

Frantz alleged that the Frantz/Roeller Dispute arose due to Mr. Roeller's

"erroneous [deposition] testimony" in support of IIB' s Fraud Action in the Bankruptcy Case. Id.
at 241. In shott, Frantz assetted that Judge Yerby was biased as to the case at hand because, as a
mediator, he "became very familiar with some [unspecified] key matters" between IIB and
Frantz (even though IIB was not a patty to the Frantz/Roeller Dispute). Id. at 242. Contrary to
his claim that Judge Yerby was biased, in the Motion to Vacate, Frantz conceded that at the
hearing for the Motion to Extend, "it appear[ed] Judge Yerby did not recognize Frantz['s] nmne
or face, just as Frantz did not associate or register where he had seen [Judge] Yerby before." Id.
at 240. Similarly, at the ReconsiderN acate Hearing before Judge Christensen, Frantz admitted
that "no impa1tiality would exist" on the part of Judge Yerby, because Judge Yerby did not
"remember[] anything about his private work on [the Frantz/Roeller Dispute] ... and the fact
that Judge Yerby is pure in hemt and incredible." Hr'g Tr. at 20:7-12. Ultimately, however,
Frantz asserted that Judge Verby's pure-heartedness did not matter "for purposes of [28 U.S.C.
Section 455]" and that "Judge Yerby may have felt some indifference to Frantz due to the
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knowledge he gained from learning about the Frantz/lIB/Roeller story in [the Frantz/Roeller
Dispute] and the fact that Judge Yerby was not successful resolving the matter between Frantz
and Roeller." Hr'g Tr. at 20:10-12; R. at 246 (emphasis added).
Frantz also filed the ADA Notice before the ReconsiderNacate Hearing, on October 18,
2017 Gust six (6) days prior to the scheduled hearing). R. at 12, 333--45. In the ADA Notice,

Frantz alleged that he had been diagnosed with dyslexia, which caused him to structure sentences
and comprehend spoken and written words at a first-grade level. Id. at 339. In light of his
diagnosis, Frantz requested seventeen (17) accommodations, which included the following
requests:
[1 OJ Allow for change of procedures to accommodate a less formal
proceeding as they relate to the interaction with witnesses, court
staff, aids and litigant in the court room;

[15] Provide a legal assistant who can; interpret and aid the litigant
to re-phrase questions during oral arguments and cross
examination to assist in lack of foundation standards, opposing
counsel objections and how question are presented/asked during
cross examination and who can assist in locating documentation
for the litigant.

[16] ... Provide a list of likely cross examination topics in advance
in order to give the person/witness an opportunity to consider their
responses.

Id. at 339--40. Many of Frantz's requests, including the above-referenced requests, applied only
to evidentiary hearings and were thus inapplicable to the ReconsiderN acate Hearing, a non·
evidentiary hearing.
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At the outset of the ReconsiderN acate Hearing, Judge Christensen noted that Frantz was
being accompanied by a court-appointed reader, a Kootenai County court assistance officer
named Mr. Sturgell, in response to his ADA Notice. Hr'g Tr. at 5:1-6 (Oct. 24, 2017). Frantz
was not satisfied with the court-appointed reader and argued that "he was perfectly capable of
reading words on a piece of paper at a high school level," but he wanted "an interpreter, per se."

Id. at 6:10-19, 7:2-15. Judge Cln·istensen interpreted Frantz's argument as a request for counsel
and noted that Frantz had elected to represent himself. Id. at 6:2-9. Further, Judge Christensen
explained that Frantz was not entitled to free counsel in this matter because it was a civil case,
and he concluded that a "reasonable accommodation ha[d] been made to Mr. Frantz for these
motions," through Mr. Sturgell.

Id. at 6:2-9, 13:7-9.

Instead of objecting to Judge

Christensen's conclusion, Frantz proceeded to argue the merits of his motions during which
6

Mr. Sturgelldidmorethansimplyread words to Frantz. Id. at 10:15-11:6; 12:1-13:13; 27:111; 28:8 - 29:3. Indeed, Mr. Sturgell summarized oral argument by IIB's counsel and explained
the process and proceedings to Frantz as they occurred, which is what Frantz had originally
requested. Id.
On November 8, 2017, Judge Cln·istensen issued the Reconsider/Vacate Order, which
addressed both of Frantz's motions. R. at 363-68. First, Judge Christensen addressed Frantz's
Motion to Reconsider. Id. Although Frantz had identified several federal statutory exemptions

6

Frantz failed to notice the Motion to Vacate for hearing. R. at 12. Nevertheless, IIB's
counsel was willing to proceed on both motions to avoid any further delays and additional fees
and costs. See Hr'g Tr. at 9:2- 11 :8 (Oct. 24, 2017).
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in his motion, Judge Christensen held that none of the exemptions applied to the Bankruptcy
Claims sold at the Sheriffs Sale. Id. at 364-65. Specifically, Judge Christensen stated that "any
extension [of time to file a claim of exemption] would be as futile now as it was when Judge
Yerby issued his decision. Thus, the motion is denied." Id. (emphasis in original). Judge
Christensen also reiterated that Frantz's original claim of exemption was untimely, Id. at 36364,
Second, Judge Christensen denied Frantz's Motion to Vacate, which Frantz had filed
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

Id. at 366-67.

Judge

Christensen agreed with the argument that IIB asserted in its brief-that the Frantz/Roeller
Dispute, and Judge Verby's purpo1ied mediation thereof, was irrelevant to the case at hand. Id.
at 366. Indeed, Judge Cln·istensen highlighted the fact that Mr. Roeller was not discussed in the
underlying motion for summary judgment, the memorandum decision on the motion for
summary judgment, the First Appeal, the Motion to Extend, the hearing over which Judge Yerby
presided, nor Judge Verby's Sheriff Sale Order. Id. Moreover, Judge Christensen emphasized
the flaws in Frantz's argument,
Frantz has failed to show, and has failed to asse1i cogent argument,
that he was prejudiced by Judge Verby's decision in the only
portion of this entire case he was involved in-deciding a postjudgment motion whereby Frantz requested the [c]ourt to grant an
extension beyond the statutory defined period, in order to file a
claim of exemption to a sheriffs sale that already occmTed for
prope1iy that would not have been exempt. The [c]omi is not
persuaded that had a different judge heard the motion for an
extension, a different result would have been reached. That
finding is buttressed by this [c]ourt's reconsidering that very issue
and finding no basis to grant the extension or modify Judge
Verby's decision.
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Id. at 367 (emphasis added). On December 18, 2017, Frantz filed a Notice of Appeal. Id. at 13.
II.

ISSUES RAISED BY APPELLANT

Frantz's Appellate Brief is difficult to follow, but based on a liberal reading thereof, it
appears that he is asking this Court to review the following issues:
1.

Whether Judgment should be vacated because Judges Yerby and/or Christensen
failed to recuse themselves sua sponte.

2.

Whether Judgment should be vacated because Judge Christensen failed to comply
with the ADA.

3.

Whether Frantz regained ownership of the counterclaims in the Guaranty Action
by filing a waiver of discharge in the Bankruptcy Case.

4.

Whether Frantz is entitled to costs and attorney's fees on appeal.
III.

5.

ADDITIONAL ISSUE ON APPEAL

Whether IIB is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees on appeal,
pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 12-120(5), and/or 12-121.
IV.

A.

ARGUMENT

Standard of Review.

As will be discussed herein, Frantz's appeal is procedurally defective; therefore, this
Court need not address his substantive claims. However, in the event that this Court reaches the
substance of Frantz's claims, the abuse-of-discretion standard applies.

A judge's failure to

disqualify herself or himself on the grounds of bias and/or prejudice is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion.

Smith v. Smith, 124 Idaho 431, 435, 860 P.2d 634, 638 (1993).

Similarly the
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standard for reviewing a motion for reconsideration is the same standard of review that was
applied to the original motion being reconsidered. Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276,
281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012). An appeal from an order denying relief from a sheriffs sale is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the US. v. Clapier, 121
Idaho 200, 202, 824 P.2d 131, 133 (Ct. App. 1991). The decision to grant or deny a motion
under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) is reviewed for abuse of discretion. PHH Mortg. v.
Nickerson, 160 Idaho 388, 393, 374 P.3d 551, 556 (2016). The recently-clarified abuse-of-

discretion test asks "whether the trial court: (1) conectly perceived the issue as one of discretion;
(2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the
exercise ofreason." Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, _ , 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018).
Separately, the scope of this Comt's review is limited due to Frantz's failure to suppott
his speculative and conclusory asse1tions with an adequate record or citations to authority.
Indeed, the Idaho Appellate Rules require that an appellant's argument "shall contain the
contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the reasons therefor,
with citations to authorities, statutes, and pa1ts of the transcript and record relied upon." See
PHH Mortg. v. Nickerson, 164 Idaho 33, _ , 423 P.3d 454, 459 (2018) (quoting I.A.R.

35(a)(6)). "If an appellant fails to 'assert his assignments of error with particularity and to
support his position with sufficient authority, those assignments of error are too indefinite to be
heard by [the Idaho Supreme] Comt."' Id. (quoting Bettwieser v. NY. Irrigation Dist., 154 Idaho
317, 322, 297 P.3d 1134, 1139 (2013)). Additionally,"[t]his Cou1t will not consider general
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attacks on the district court's conclusions absent specific reference to evidentiary or legal errors."
Id Arguments of that type are deemed waived. Id. Similarly, this Court has "made repeatedly

clear [that] it is improper when a party merely asks this Court to second guess the trial court in
weighing evidence. . . . Instead an appeal should be a focused argument about specific legal
errors that occurred at the court below supported by the citations to the trial transcript and
discussion, and legal authority applicable to the case." Estate of Elcic v. Geico Indem. Co., 163
Idaho 895, _ , 422 P.3d 1101, 1103 (2018) (citations omitted). This Court requires a clear
record of any alleged error and "[ a]ppellants have a particular duty to provide this record." Id
"The paity appealing a decision of the [trial] court bears the burden of ensuring that this Court is
provided a sufficient record for review of the [trial] comt's decision." Id at 1103-04 (brackets
in original) (quoting Gibson v. Ada Cnty., 138 Idaho 787, 790, 69 P.3d 1048, 1051 (2003)). "[I]f
the Appellant fails to comply with this duty, 'this Court will presume that the absent p01tion
supp01ts the findings of the [trial] comt.' ... We will not presume en·or from a 'silent record or
from the lack of a record."' Id.
Lastly, "[p]ro se litigants are not entitled to special consideration or leniency because
they represent themselves. . . . Rather pro se litigants must conform to the saine standards and
rules as litigants represented by attorneys, and this Comt will address the issues accordingly."
PHH Mortg. v. Nickerson, 164 Idaho at_, 423 P.3d at 459 (quoting Mendez v, Univ. Health
Servs. Boise State Univ., 163 Idaho 237,242,409 P.3d 817,822 (2018)).
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B.

As a Preliminary Matter, the Issues Relating to the Merits of the Sheriff Sale
Order and Frantz's Ownership of the Counterclaims Are Not Properly Before this
Court.
Although the issue was set fotth in the initial Notice of Appeal, Frantz's Appellate Brief

entirely fails to dispute the merits of the Sheriff Sale Order i.e., whether Frantz received adequate
notice of the levy and Sheriffs Sale and/or whether there is an applicable exemption under Idaho
law as to the Sheriffs Sale of the Bankruptcy Claims. Compare R. at 370-71 with Appellant's
Br. at 18-19. Consequently, despite the fact that the merit of the Sheriff Sale Order was one of
only four issues raised on appeal in the Notice, it is not before this Court. Suitts v. Nix, 141
Idaho 706, 708, 117 P.3d 120, 122 (2005) (holding that the issues presented on appeal are limited
to those raised in an initial brief on appeal and arguments raised for the first time in an
appellant's reply brief will not be considered).
Similarly, whether Frantz regained "ownership" of the counterclaims in regard to the
Guaranty Action is not at issue on this appeal because it is the subject of the Companion Appeal,
Idaho Supreme Court Case No. 46237-2018. See Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.3d
1146, 1152 n.10 (201 O); Blaha v. Eagle City Council, 134 Idaho 768, 769, 9 P.3d 1234, 1235 n.1
(2000). Indeed, Frantz admits that this issue will be addressed in the third appeal before this
Comt. Appellant's Br. at 26. Accordingly, these two issues are not properly before this Court.
C.

Frantz's Appeal Suffers From Two Fundamental Flaws, Both of Which Warrant
Complete Dismissal.
This Court need not address Frantz's substantive arguments because his appeal, as a

whole, suffers from two independent flaws, both of which warrant complete dismissal. First,
Frantz ignores the fact that this Comt's review is limited to the post-judgment proceedings, i.e.,
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the Sheriff Sale Order and the ReconsiderN acate Order. Instead of requesting relief as to the
post-judgment proceedings, Frantz argues that this Court should vacate the 2016 Judgment so
that the Guaranty Action may be re-litigated. Frantz's argument is undermined by the fact that
this Court affitmed the Judgment in the First Appeal, thereby creating the "law of the case."
The "law of the case" doctrine is well-established in Idaho and provides that, where an
appellate court states a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, "such pronouncement
becomes the law of the case and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in
the trial coutt and upon subsequent appeal." ParkWest Homes, LLC v. Barnson, 154 Idaho 678,
683, 302 P.3d 18, 23 (2012) (quoting Swanson v. Swanson, 134 Idaho 512,515, 5 P.3d 973, 976
(2000)); PHH Mortg. v. Nickerson, 164 Idaho 33, _ , 423 P.3d 454, 459 (2018). "Like stare
decisis, the 'law of the case' protects against re-litigation of settled issues," and "prevents
consideration on a subsequent appeal of alleged errors that might have been, but were not raised
in the earlier appeal." ParkWest Homes, LLC, 154 Idaho at 683,302 P.3d at 23 (quoting Taylor
v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 709, 201 P.3d 1282, 1286 (2009)); Sun Valley Ranches, Inc. v. Prairie
Power Co-op, Inc., 124 Idaho 125, 129, 856 P.2d 1292, 1298 (Ct. App. 1993).

"Without something like [the law of the case], an adverse judicial decision would become
little more than an invitation to take a mulligan, encouraging lawyers and litigants alike to
believe that if at first you don't succeed, just try again. This would lead to wasted judicial
resources and increased delay in resolving cases, which would only serve to erode the public's
ttust in the coutt system." PHH Mortg., 164 Idaho at_, 423 P.3d at 459 (citations omitted).
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Although Frantz attempts to confuse the issues with claims of judicial bias, the crux of
his appeal is clearly an attempt to re-litigate the Judgment. However, the Judgment became the
"law of the case" after the First Appeal. Idaho Indep. Bank v. Frantz, 162 Idaho 509, 510, 399
P.3d 836, 837 (2017). Consequently, the First Appeal must be "adhered to throughout [the]
subsequent progress, both in the trial court and upon [this] subsequent appeal," and this Comi
may not now consider issues that were previously raised on appeal, nor may it consider "alleged
errors that might have been, but were not raised in the earlier appeal." ParkWest Homes, LLC,
154 Idaho at 683, 302 P.3d at 23. This Comt recently reiterated its adherence to the "law of the
case" doctrine in PHH Mortgage v. Nickerson. 164 Idaho at

, 423 P.3d at 459. In that case,

this Comt noted that, of the seventeen issues raised by appellants in their opening brief, most
involved an attempt to re-litigate the prior determination of the Court, and "because we adhere to
the 'law of the case,' this Court will not consider such issues." Id. Accordingly, the Comi
limited the scope of the appeal to the post-judgment execution issues. Id. at _ , 423 P .3d at
459-60. Similar to the appellants in PHH Mortgage, Frantz attempts to re-litigate issues that
were resolved by, or could have been raised in, the First Appeal. Most notably, Frantz requests
that this Court vacate the Judgment. Because the Judgment became the "law of the case" after
the First Appeal, this Comi should refuse to address Frantz's arguments.
Second, Frantz's appeal should be dismissed because his assignments of etTOr are not
supported by cogent argument, authority, or citations to the record; thus, they are too indefinite
to be heard by this Comt. Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010). In
Bach, this Comt noted that, due to appellant's convoluted briefing, it was difficult to follow his
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arguments or discern how they may be legally supported.

Id. at 791, 229 P.3d at 1153.

Additionally, this Court held that the briefing did not comply with Idaho Appellate Rule
35(a)(6), which requires an appellant's argument to "contain the contentions of the appellant
with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to the
authorities, statutes and paiis of the transcript and record relied upon." Bach, 148 Idaho at 790,
229 P.3d at 1152; Estate of Ekic v. Geico Indem. Co., 163 Idaho 895, 422 P.3d 1101 (2018);
I.AR 36(a)(6). Due to Bach's failure to comply with the Idaho Appellate Rules, this Couti did

not consider the bulk of his appeal. Bach, 148 Idaho at 790, 229 P.3d at 1152. Similarly, in
PHH Mortgage, this Couti refused to address the substance of the appellants' "[g]eneric,

recycled accusations" because the brief did not contain relevant legal citations, nor did it provide
factual or legal bases. PHH Mortg., 164 Idaho at_, 423 P.3d at 460.
Like the appellants in Bach and PHH Mortgage, Frantz's arguments are difficult to
follow and unsupported by authority or citations to the record on appeal. Indeed, as previously
discussed, nearly all of Frantz' s purpmied citations to the record on appeal are actually citations
to his Master Guide, several sections of which are not part of the record on appeal. Thus, Frantz
has failed to cany his burden of ensuring that this Court is provided with a sufficient record to
review the district couti's decision. Estate ofEkic v. Geico Inden1. Co., 163 Idaho 895,422 P.3d
1101, 1103-04 (2018) ("The party appealing a decision of the trial couti bears the burden of
ensuring that this Couti is provided a sufficient record for review of the trial couti's decision.");
Gibson v. Ada Cnty., 138 Idaho 787, 790, 69 P.3d 1048, 1051 (2003). Most noticeably absent

from Frantz's Appellate Brief are citations in suppmi of his claims that Judges Yerby and
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Christensen were biased. Moreover, Frantz does not explain what Judge Yerby allegedly learned
from the Frantz/Roeller Dispute that would purportedly cause the bias, nor does Frantz explain
when or how this information was purportedly provided to Judge Christensen. It stands to reason
that if the alleged bias were so egregious as to waiTant the vacation of the Judgment, which was
affirmed by the First Appeal, Frantz would explain the facts upon which the alleged bias was
based. Frantz fails to do so. Accordingly, this Court must presume that the absent portion of the
record "supports the findings of the trial court. [This Court] will not presume error from a silent
record or from the lack of a record." Estate of Ekic v. Geico Jnden1. Co., 163 Idaho 895, _ ,
422 P.3d 1101, 1104 (2018).
Similarly, Frantz has failed to supp01t his arguments with relevant authority.

His

citations to case law and statutes are either incorrect or inapplicable. For example, three of the
seven cases upon which he relies relate to the incorrect standard of review. Appellant's Br. at
19-20. The remaining four citations are largely inapplicable because they are federal cases
offered in supp01t of umelated state-law claims. Appellant's Br. at 20-21, 40-41. Specifically,
Frantz improperly cites to a federal statute in suppo1t of his argument that the state court judges
should be disqualified. Appellant's Br. at 20-21. In sum, this Court should dismiss Frantz's
appeal in its entirety because, like the appellants in Bach and PHH Mortgage, Frantz's
arguments lack "coherence, citations to the record, citations of applicable authority, or
comprehensible argument." PHH Mortg., 164 Idaho at_, 423 P.3d at 460; Bach, 148 Idaho at
791,229 P.3d at 1153.
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D.

Frantz's Argument that the Judgment Should Be Vacated Due to the Alleged Bias
of Judges Verby and Christensen Is Meritless.
Although Frantz's eleven arguments on appeal are difficult to follow, the theme of his

Appellate Brief is that Judge Verby's alleged bias in the Motion to Extend and the corresponding
Sheriff Sale Order (issued in July 2017) was imputed to Judge Christensen, infected all of the
post-judgment proceedings, and requires a retroactive vacation of the Judgment that was entered
in January 2016. Frantz's asse1tion is conclusory and speculative, and he fails to include even
one citation to the record on appeal that demonstrates the alleged bias.
In arguing that the judges were biased, Frantz incorrectly relies upon 28 United States
Code Section 455, which applies to federal court judges. Appellant's Br. at 20-21; 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(a).

The correct rule to apply in this case is found in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure

40(b)(l)(D), which provides that a judge may be disqualified ifhe or she is "biased or prejudiced
for or against any patty or the subject matter of the action." I.R.C.P. 40(b)(l)(D). To effectuate
a dismissal on this basis, a party must file a motion to disqualify and an affidavit "stating the
specific grounds upon which the disqualification is based and the facts relied upon in support of
the motion." I.R.C.P. 40(b)(2). Vague and factually unsubstantiated allegations of bias are
insufficient to warrant disqualification. Samuel v. Hepworth, 134 Idaho 84, 88, 996 P.2d 303,
307 (2000) (implicitly overruled on other grounds in Idaho Dep 't of Health & Welfare v. Doe,
150 Idaho 752, 764, 250 P.3d 803, 815 (Ct. App. 2011)), For years, Idaho appellate courts
followed the disqualification standard set forth in United States v, Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563,
583, 86 S, Ct. 1698, 1710 (1966), i.e., the alleged bias or prejudice "must stem from an
extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the
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judge learned from his participation in the case." Idaho Dep 't of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 150
Idaho 752, 764, 250 P.3d 803, 815 (Ct. App. 2011). However, both the United States Supreme
Court and this Court have abandoned the Grinnell approach. Id. According to the modified
approach, which was established by the United States Supreme Court in Liteky v. United States,
510 U.S. 540, 114 S. Ct. 1147 (1994), and adopted by this Court in Bach v. Bagley, the alleged
bias or prejudice must be "so extreme as to display clear inability to render fair judgment," and
"unless there is a demonstration of 'pervasive bias' derived either from an extrajudicial source or
facts and events occurring at trial, there is no basis for judicial recusal." Bach, 148 Idaho at 79192, 229 P.3d at 1153-54. Accordingly, to succeed on a bias argument, Frantz must demonstrate
the existence of a pervasive bias that was so extreme such that Judges Yerby and Christensen
were unable to render a fair judgment. Id. The record in this case is to the contrary.
Frantz's argument that both judges were biased should be dismissed for the following
four reasons: (!) the argument is contrary to evidence; (2) the argument is contrary to law;
(3) Frantz has failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion; and (4) the relief Frantz seeks is not
available on appeal. Additionally, this Court should dismiss Frantz's argument as it relates to
Judge Christensen because Frantz raises the issue for the first time on appeal.
First, this Court should dismiss Frantz's argument because it is contrary to the evidence.
Frantz fails to provide meaningful citations to the record on appeal. Indeed, he presents no
support in the record (or otherwise) for his speculative claim that Judges Yerby and Christensen
were biased. Instead, his argument is propped up by conclusory asse1tions that Judge Yerby
learned "damaging evidence" in the Frantz/Roeller Dispute. Similarly, Frantz's allegation that
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Judge Christensen was biased is based on the unsupported claim that Judge Yerby informed
Judge Christensen of the "damaging evidence." Appellant's Br. at 19, 26, 28-30, 32, 36, 41, 44.
Frantz's vague and factually unsubstantiated allegations do not wanant disqualification. Samuel
v. Hepworth, 134 Idaho 84, 88, 996 P.2d 303, 307 (2000) (implicitly overruled on other grounds

in Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare v, Doe, 150 Idaho 752, 764, 250 PJd 803, 815 (Ct. App.
2011)). In any event, Frantz's unsupported, speculative claims certainly would not rise to the
level of bias or prejudice "so extreme as to display clear inability to render fair judgment."
Bach, 148 Idaho at 791-92, 229 PJd at 1153-54,

In fact, the record before this Comi

demonstrates the contrary, After the Sheriffs Sale, in August 2017, Frantz actually requested
that Judge Yerby or Judge Christensen hear the Motion for Reconsideration, rather than Judge
Luster, because they were most familiar with the case, Hr'g Tr. at 19:5-13 (Oct. 24, 2017), At
that point-nearly a year after the Frantz/Roeller Dispute-Frantz had no problem with Judges
Yerby and Christensen.

Yet, after receiving adverse decisions, he now claims that Judges

Christensen and Verby were biased.
Further, in his Motion to Vacate, Frantz admitted that Judge Yerby "may not have
remembered anything about his private work on" the Frantz/Roeller Dispute; was "pure in heaii
and incorruptible;" and appeared to not "recognize Frantz['s] name or face,"

R. at 240,

Likewise, at the ReconsiderN acate Hearing, Frantz conceded that Judge Yerby may not have
"remembered anything about his private work on [the Frantz/Roeller Dispute], and therefore no
impaiiiality exists," Hr'g Tr. at 20:1-11 (Oct. 24, 2017), In shmi, not only does Frantz fail to
suppoti his argument with citations to the record, the record on appeal and in Frantz's own words
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contradict Frantz's argument.

Accordingly, he has not established that a pervasive bias or

extreme prejudice prevented Judge Yerby from rendering a fair decision. It goes without saying
that any asse1tions against Judge Christensen would fail for the same reason. Therefore, this
Comt should dismiss Frantz's argument.
Second, Frantz's argument should be dismissed because it is contrary to law. In light of
Frantz's failure to support his argument with evidence of bias, it appears that the true basis of
Frantz's argument is that the district comt must be biased because it ruled in IIB's favor. Of
course, that is not a valid basis upon which to disqualify a judge, nor does it demonstrate bias.
This Court, citing U.S. Supreme Court precedent, has stated:
First, judicial rulings alone almost never constitute valid basis for
bias or paitiality motion . , . and can only in the rarest
circumstances evidence the degree of favoritism or antagonism
required . . . . Almost invariably they are proper grounds for
appeal, not for recusal. Second, opinions formed by the judge on
the basis of facts introduced or events occmTing in the course of
the cunent proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a
basis for bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep seated
favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment
impossible. Thus, judicial remarks during the course of a trial that
are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the
parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or paitiality
challenge ....

Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 792, 229 P.3d 1146, 1154 (2010) (quoting Liteky v. United
States, 510 U.S. 540,554 (1994)).
Not only has Frantz failed to demonstrate pervasive bias or extreme prejudice, he has also
failed to adhere to the conect procedure by which to seek a disqualification, i.e., a Rule 40
motion. See Christensen v. Ransom, 123 Idaho 99, 104, 844 P.2d 1349, 1354 (Ct. App. 1992)
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(holding that judicial bias will not be considered on appeal in the absence of a motion to
disqualify the judge below). Frantz's Motion to Vacate was not a motion to disqualify. R. at
239-49. Instead, it was a motion asking Judge Christensen to overturn the Judgment and the
Sheriff Sale Order because of the "appearance of bias," which again, is not the applicable
standard. R. at 248-49.
Third, Frantz's argument should be dismissed because he has failed to demonstrate that
an abuse of discretion occuned.

As mentioned above, a judge's decision regarding

disqualification is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Smith v. Smith, 124 Idaho 431, 435, 860
P.2d 634, 638 (1993). In Green River Ranches, LLC v. Silva Land Co., LLC, this Court found
that the appellant "failed to demonstrate, or even attempt to demonstrate, that an abuse of
discretion occurred under any part of the test applied by this Court .... and its failure to do so is
fatal to its argument." 162 Idaho 385, 392, 397 P.3d 1114, 1151 (2017). Similarly here, Frantz
has failed to even attempt to demonstrate that an abuse of discretion occurred; therefore, this
Court should dismiss his argument.

7

However, even if this Court reaches the substance of the

issue, the record clearly demonstrates that Judge Christensen did not abuse his discretion in
denying the Motion to Vacate. First, Judge Christensen correctly perceived the issue as one of
7

As set forth earlier in this brief, Frantz has not raised any issue as to the underlying merits
of the Sheriff Sale Order and Motion for Reconsideration; therefore, Frantz has waived the
issues. But even if that were ignored, Frantz has failed to explain how Judge Christensen abused
his discretion in denying the Motion for Reconsideration. In the ReconsiderN acate Order, Judge
Christensen recognized that his decision was discretionary, and then proceeded to act within the
boundaries of the court's disctetion, with the applicable legal standards, and with the exercise of
reason. See R. at 363-66. Watson v. Navistar Int'/ Transp. Corp., 121 Idaho 643, 650, 827 P.2d
656, 663 (1992) (this Court reviews a motion to reconsider for abuse of discretion).
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discretion. R. at 366. Next, Judge Christensen acknowledged the applicable legal standard by
citing Cummings v. Stephens, 160 Idaho 847, 850, 380 P.3d 168, 171 (2016), Lastly, Judge
Christensen acted within the outer bounds of his discretion by restating the parties' arguments
and the facts, and reasoning that Frantz's argument failed because it was not supported by the
referenced facts or law, R. at 366-67. Moreover, Judge Christensen stated that his decision was
buttressed by the fact that he reconsidered the "very issue [that was before Judge Yerby] and
[found] no basis to grant the extension or modify Judge Yerby's decision." Id. at 367.
Specifically, Judge Christensen explained that Mr. Roeller was not discussed in the
summary judgment motion, the summary judgment order, the First Appeal before this Court, the
argument before Judge Yerby, or Judge Yerby' s Sheriff Sale Order. Id.

Judge Christensen

reasoned that the relevance of Mr. Roeller, if any, was limited to the Fraud Action, which was
never heard in any case because Frantz filed a voluntary waiver of discharge, thereby mooting
the need for the Fraud Action. Id. at 366-67. Based upon Judge Christensen's well-reasoned
decision, there is no merit to Frantz's claim that Judges Yerby or Christensen abused their
discretion.
Fourth, Frantz's argument should be dismissed because the ultimate relief Frantz seeksvacation of the Judgment and a new trial-is not available on appeal due to the law of the case
doctrine, as set forth above, Judge Yerby's involvement in this case was limited to a single postjudgment proceeding (the Motion to Extend and the conesponding Sheriff Sale Order), R, at 11,
208-13.

Frantz's Motion to Extend before Judge Yerby did not dispute the merits of the

Judgment; rather, Frantz sought "an extension beyond the statutory defined period, in order to
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file a claim of exemption to a sheriffs sale that already occurred for property that would not
have been exempt." Id. at 367. The limited nature of Judge Verby's involvement-and the fact
that he was involved in a post-judgment proceeding--demonstrates that Judge Verby could not
have affected the Judgment. For this reason, Frantz's argument is meritless.
In addition to the reasons set forth above, Frantz's argument that Judge Christensen was
biased should be dismissed because it is raised for the first time on appeal. McLean v. Cheyovich
Family Trust, 153 Idaho 425, 430, 283 P.3d 742, 747 (2012) ("This Court will not consider

arguments raised for the first time on appeal."). In Christensen v. Ransom, the Idaho Court of
Appeals refused to address the appellant's argument that the district court was biased because the
issue was not raised until after judgment was entered and an appeal had been filed. 123 Idaho
99, 103-04, 844 P.2d 1349, 1353-54 (Ct. App. 1992). Similarly, Frantz did not raise the issue of
Judge Christensen's alleged bias until after: (a) Judgment had been entered; (b) the
ReconsiderN acate Order had been issued; and (c) the appeals to this Court were filed. Frantz' s
failure to raise the issue below is fatal to his argument on appeal.
E.

Frantz's Argument That He Did Not Receive a Reasonable ADA Accommodation Is
Meritless.

On October 18, 2017, Frantz filed the ADA Notice, which set forth seventeen
accommodation requests in varying degrees of reasonability. R. at 12, 333-45. Although IIB
was suspicious as to whether Frantz's request was a delay tactic, IIB did not oppose the request
and was not involved in Frantz's obtainment of an accommodation. Apparently, Frantz, the
district court, and Mr. Sturgell (the Kootenai County Court Assistance Officer) mrnnged for

Mr. Sturgell to assist Frantz at the Reconsider/Vacate Hearing. Hr'g Tr. at 5:1-8 (Oct. 24,

-2840986,0211.11421951.2

2017). Frantz was not satisfied with this accommodation, but he did not object after Judge
Christensen stated that a "reasonable accommodation ha[d] been made to Mr. Frantz." Id. at
12:1 - 13:25. Instead, he proceeded to argue the merits of the two pending motions with the
assistance of Mr. Sturgell. Thereafter, Judge Christensen's ReconsiderNacate Order made no
mention of the ADA issue.

R. at 363-67.

Frantz now urges this Court to find that the

accommodation was not reasonable. Appellant's Br. at 32-35. On appeal, Frantz does not
request specific relief, but in light of the theme of his brief, he likely seeks vacation of the
Judgment and a new trial. Frantz's argument is meritless for four reasons.
As a preliminary matter, it appears that Frantz's ADA claim is not properly before this
Court. Indeed, the focus of Frantz's ADA argument is that Judge Clll'istensen and/or Kootenai
County did not provide a reasonable accommodation.

Frantz does not assert that IIB was

involved or at fault. Accordingly, Frantz's ADA claim should not be addressed in this appeal.
The first tlu·ee bases upon which this Court may dismiss Frantz's argument are
procedural in nature: (!) there was no adverse ruling; (2) the issue is raised for the first time on
appeal; and (3) the argument is time-baned.
In accordance with this Court's holding in Kirk v. Westcott, this Court should dismiss
Frantz's ADA argument because there was no adverse ruling. 160 Idaho 893,894,382 P.3d 342,
343 (2016). The district court did not deny the request made by Frantz. Instead, the district
court responded by appointing Mr. Sturgell to assist Frantz. Hr'g Tr. at 5:1-6. In Kirk v.

Westcott, this Court dismissed the appellants' argument because the record did not contain an
adverse ruling.

160 Idaho at 894, 382 P.3d at 343. The appellants sought to terminate an
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easement, and on appeal, they argued that the easement was void for lack of an adequate legal
description. Id. at 899, 382 P.3d at 348. This Court declined to address the issue on appeal
because the appellants "never asked the district court to determine whether the description of the
easement was legally sufficient." Id. In support of its holding, this Court reiterated that "[i]t is
well established that in order for an issue to be raised on appeal, the record must reveal an
adverse rnling which forms the basis for an assignment of error. . . . Hence, issues not raised
below but raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered or reviewed." Id. (quoting
Whitted v. Canyon Cnty. Bd. ofComm'rs, 137 Idaho 118, 121-22, 44 P.3d 1173, 1176-77

(2002)).
This Court should dismiss Frantz's argument for the same reason it dismissed the
appellants' argument in Kirk. Indeed, just as the appellants in Kirk "never asked the district
court to determine whether the description of the easement was legally sufficient," Frantz never
asked the district comt to determine whether the ADA accommodation was reasonable. Frantz
requested an ex parte meeting in chambers to discuss the ADA accommodation, and Judge
Christensen remarked that the accommodation was reasonable; however, Frantz never
specifically raised the issue by motion or otherwise, nor did Frantz object to Judge Christensen's
remark that the accommodation was reasonable.

Tr. Hr'g at 5:1 - 13:25 (Oct. 24, 2017).

Instead, Frantz proceeded with his oral argument on the two motions at issue. Id. at 12: 1 13:25. Moreover, Frantz has yet to file an ADA cause of action. Therefore, in accordance with
this Court's holding in Kirk, Frantz's argument must be dismissed. See Locker v. How Soel, Inc.,
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151 Idaho 696, 701, 263 P.3d 750, 755 (2011) (dismissing an appellant's ADA claim because it
was raised for the first time on appeal).
If this Comt finds that the issue is properly before the Comt because Judge Christensen's

remark constituted an appealable order, Frantz's argument must still be dismissed.

Idaho

Appellate Rule 14 provides that an appeal from the district coutt may be made "only by
physically filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the district court within 42 days," but the
"time for an appeal from any civil judgment or order in an action is terminated by the filing of a
timely motion which, if granted, could affect any findings of fact, conclusions of law or any
judgment in the action."

I.A.R. 14.

Here, the only potential order on Frantz's ADA

accommodation request was made at the Reconsider/Vacate Hearing on October 24, 2017, as the
ReconsiderNacate Order makes no reference to the ADA Notice or request. R. at 363-67; Hr'g
Tr. at 11:9 - 13:25 (Oct. 24, 2017). Frantz filed his Notice of Appeal 55 days after the hearing,
on December 18, 2017. R. at 12,369. Therefore, Frantz's Notice of Appeal was untimely as to
the ADA accommodation issue, and this Court should dismiss the argument. See Hamilton v.

Rybar, 111 Idaho 396, 397, 742 P.2d 132, 133 (1986), abrogated on other grounds by McIntire

v. Orr, 122 Idaho 351,353,834 P.2d 868,870 (1992).
Lastly, in the event that this Comt reaches the substance ofFrantz's ADA claim, it should
still dismiss the claim because Frantz has failed to demonstrate that the accommodation was not
reasonable or that a reasonable accommodation could have been provided. Title II of the ADA,
entitled "Public Services," provides that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by
reason of such disability, be excluded from paiticipation in or be denied the benefits of the
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services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such
entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132. To bring a claim under Title II, a plaintiff must prove:
(1) he is a "qualified individual with a disability"; (2) he was either
excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of a public
entity's services, programs or activities, or was otherwise
discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) such exclusion,
denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability.

Weinreich v. Los Angeles Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 1997).
Moreover, the plaintiff must establish the existence of specific reasonable accommodations that
the defendant failed to provide. Memmer v. Marin Cnty. Courts, 169 F.3d 630, 633 (9th Cir.
1999).
On appeal, Frantz's argument focuses on Judge Christensen's refusal to address, in detail,
each ofFrantz's seventeen (17) requested accommodations. Appellant's Br. at 32-35; R. at 33940. Frantz ignores the fact that Judge Christensen expressly stated he had reviewed the ADA
Notice and had provided reasonable accommodation in the form of Mr. Sturgell's assistance. Id.
at 5:1 - 13:25. Moreover, instead of disputing Judge Christensen's statement that a reasonable
accommodation had been made, Frantz chose to proceed with the oral argument on the motions
with Mr. Sturgell's assistance. Id. Mr. Sturgell summarized oral argument and explained the
process and proceedings to Frantz as they occurred, which satisfied the applicable
accommodations requested by Frantz. Id. at 10:15 -11:16; 12:1-13; 27:1-11; 28:8 -29:3; R. at
339-40.

Significantly, Frantz does not even attempt to establish that a specific reasonable

accommodation existed, but was not provided. Memmer, 169 F.3d at 633. Therefore, even if
this Court addresses the substance of Frantz's ADA argument, it should be dismissed because
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Frantz has failed to make the requisite showing of a reasonable accommodation that existed, but
was not provided.
In sum, this Court should dismiss Frantz's ADA argument because: (1) there was no
adverse ruling; (2) the issue is raised for the first time on appeal; (3) the argument is time-baned;
and (4) Frantz's argument fails on the merits.

V.

FRANTZ HAS NO BASIS TO SEEK AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES
Frantz seeks attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-120(3).

Frantz's request for costs and attorney's fees fails for the same reasons that his similar request
failed in the First Appeal. Idaho Indep. Bank v. Frantz, 162 Idaho 509,517,399 P.3d 836,844
(2017). First, persons representing themselves are not entitled to an award of attorney fees. Id.
Although Frantz has had multiple attorneys in the past eight years of this litigation, the record in
this case is clear that Frantz has proceeded pro se as to the appeal currently before this Comi. R.
at 369-72. Second, for the reasons set fo1ih herein, Frantz should not be the prevailing party in
this appeal; therefore, he is not entitled to attorney's fees on appeal. Idaho Indep. Bank, 162
Idaho at 517,399 P.3d at 844.

VI.

IIB IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL

IIB requests costs and attorney's fees on appeal in accordance with Idaho Appellate
Rules 40 and 41, and Idaho Code Sections 12-120(5), and 12-121.
Idaho Code Section 12-120(5) provides as follows:
In all instances where a paity is entitled to reasonable
attorney's fees and costs under subsection (1), (2), (3) or (4) of this
section, such party shall also be entitled to reasonable
postjudgment attorney's fees and costs incuned in attempting to
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collect on the judgment. Such attorney's fees and costs shall be set
by the court following the filing of a memorandum of attorney's
fees and costs with notice to all parties and hearing.
I.C. § 12-120(5).

In the underlying Judgment, and on the First Appeal, IIB was awarded

attorney's fees pursuant to 12-120(3) because the action was based upon a commercial
transaction. R. at 6-7, 47-49; Idaho Indep. Bank v. Frantz, 162 Idaho 509, 517, 399 P.3d 836,
844 (2017). This appeal, however, concerns post-judgment proceedings related to IIB's attempt
to recover on the Judgment. Therefore, in accordance with the plain language of Idaho Code
Section 12-120(5), IIB is entitled to an award of attorney's fees. This position is supported by
this Coutt's recent decision in Medical Recovery Services, LLC v. Lopez, wherein this Court
explained that Idaho Code Section 12-120(5) is the proper basis upon which to award attorney's
fees when an appeal is taken "from a proceeding relating to the collection on a judgment." 163
Idaho 281, -

, 411 P.3d 1182, 1185 (2018).

Alternatively, IIB requests attorney's fees on appeal according to Idaho Code Section 12121, which provides that reasonable attorney's fees may be awarded to the prevailing party when
a coutt finds that the case "was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, umeasonably or
without foundation." LC.§ 12-121. As previously noted, Frantz's appeal is similar to the appeal
brought by the appellant in Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 229 P.3d 1146 (2010). For example,
both Frantz and Bach provided inadequate briefing, raised meritless claims, failed to preserve
issues for appeal, and failed to comply with the Idaho Appellate Rules. Id. at 797, 229 P.3d at
1159. In Bach, this Coutt determined that Bach's appeal was frivolous and awarded attorney's
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fees to the respondents. Id at 797-98, 229 P.3d at 1159-60. Likewise, this Court should find
that Frantz's appeal is frivolous and award IIB attorney's fees on appeal.

VII.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, IIB respectfully requests that this Cou1t dismiss Frantz's
appeal in its entirety and award costs and attorney's fees on appeal to IIB.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 18th day of October, 2018.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
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